Produced in collaboration with Ayin
December 26, 2024 Darfur24 Amidst the intersections of regional, political, and economic interests, the warring parties in El- Fasher, the capital of North Darfur, are waging a relentless war. The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which have been besieging the city for nearly eight months, are determined to capture this strategic city and extend their control over the entire region.
The RSF’s bid to control the Darfur region in western Sudan is paralleled by political moves aimed at forming a prospective government in areas under their control, which include 10 states wholly or partially, with complete control over four states in Darfur. Additionally, there are press reports of increasing military support from the UAE for the takeover of El Fasher.
Conversely, the Army in El-Fasher fights in alliance with the joint forces, composed of Armed Movements that signed the peace agreement with the Government in 2020, most notably the Sudan Liberation Movement led by Minni Arko Minawi and the Justice and Equality Movement led by Gibril Ibrahim, along with volunteers fighting alongside the armed forces.
Economic Influence*
Economically, the resource-rich Darfur region attracts RSF’s regional allies, particularly the UAE, their most prominent ally. “Officials in Abu- Dhabi believe that this Gulf country’s interests in Sudan can not be compromised, including the issue of whether Darfur will remain part of Sudan or become a separate state,” said conflict expert Issa Gism-Allah to “Ayin” and “Darfur24.” He continued, “These discussions are taking place within regional and international circles, evidenced by understandings offered by major countries to both parties, such as ‘Leave Khartoum to gain El Fasher.'”
After nearly two years of war, the RSF’s economic influence has expanded, with complete control over gold resources and the most important cash crops, such as gum arabic, sesame, peanuts, hibiscus, and livestock.
Recently, gold purchase prices in the main Darfur mines have increased due to new traders, most of them RSF leaders, entering the markets. A witness from the Gumbila mine in “Songo” area of South Darfur told “Ayin” and “Darfur24,” “Gold prices have risen from 160,000 Sudanese pounds per gram to 220,000 Sudanese pounds in December.” He attributed the price hike to increased demand and the entry of traders from outside the traditional mining areas, buying gold in the mines and purchasing raw stone before grinding it to extract gold. A former gold trader in Nyala, with ties to the traditional mining sites in Songo, confirmed that all gold traders have withdrawn from the market due to harassment by RSF elements.
Gold trader Abu- Ibrahim pointed out that there are weekly gold collection operations by traders in Nyala and gold mines, with some individuals buying gold from shops at a profit margin of 20,000 Sudanese pounds per gram.
He said in an interview with “Darfur24” and “Ayin,” “This phenomenon has spread since last September in the city of Kass, Nyala, Songo mines, and Sulba mine north of Nyala, with large capital entering the markets, and I do not know where the purchased gold is marketed.”
According to traders, the transportation of gold to Nyala, the capital of South Darfur, is secured by armed RSF members due to the presence of armed robbery gangs on the road between Radoum and Nyala.
Gold Is Not Alone
The areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Darfur and Kordofan are among the richest in Sudan for producing important agricultural crops and livestock. To bolster its economic influence in its controlled areas and exert political and economic pressure on the Sudanese Army, the RSF banned the export of products from its controlled areas to Army-controlled areas last October; consequently, this also halted exports to Egypt following the RSF commander’s explicit accusation of Egypt supporting the Sudanese army.
Despite the RSF’s stated goal of preventing these goods from reaching other parts of Sudan and Egypt, the RSF resorted to alternative markets through capital from business groups close to them.
The Civil Administration affiliated with the RSF in Central Darfur state has engaged in reactivating border markets to export local products, revitalizing markets and revenue streams, and controlling imports and exports. This approach is mirrored by RSF Administrations in other Darfur states under their control.
A source from Mukjar locality, who works as an administrative officer and preferred anonymity, told “Darfur24” and “Ayin” that Damar Administrative Unit was once the largest exporter of gum arabic. The Sudanese Gum Arabic Company stored large quantities of gum arabic there during the winter season for transport to Khartoum. However, after the war, the RSF took control of the market and began exporting gum arabic to Nyala at a rate of 25,000 tons per week via trucks.
The source added that he does not know where RSF exports the gum arabic, but citizens still sell their gum arabic in “Damar” market, and it is transported by trucks to Nyala.
Although some goods and crops found their way overland to neighboring countries, the RSF’s operation of Nyala Airport raises suspicions about external export operations.
The RSF reactivated Nyala Airport after installing jamming devices to protect it from airstrikes by the Sudanese Army, according to informed sources for “Ayin” and “Darfur24.” The airport has been operational since last September, when it received its first cargo plane landing at night, staying on the runway for about an hour before departing to an unknown destination.
Since then, the airport has received 12 flights, all landing at night and staying for no more than an hour to an hour and a half, according to investigations by “Darfur24” and “Ayin.” It is not exactly known what these planes transport upon landing or departure, but RSF sources confirmed that some planes carried wounded RSF members.
Is the Military Arsenal Collapsing?
Despite the military alliance led by the Sudanese Army maintaining control over El Fasher, the massive influx of weapons to RSF forces has encouraged their leader to remain on El- Fasher front until it is fully controlled. Political analyst Ahmed Hamdan considers this inevitable, stating that all indicators point to the fall of El Fasher to RSF, which would mean the emergence of two competing governments claiming legitimacy—one led by Burhan and the other by “Hemedti,” who plans to make the Darfur region his headquarters.
Hamdan highlights developments in the conflict between Army Commander Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Darfur Region Governor and Sudan Liberation Movement leader Minni Arko Minnawi.
Researcher on Darfur region affairs, Dhirar Adam Dhirar, supports this view, noting in an interview with “Ayin” and “Darfur24” that the Military Component controlling the Sovereign Council does not have a unified vision regarding El- Fasher and the alliance with the Joint Forces.
According to Dhirar, Burhan is not enthusiastic about this alliance, while Sovereignty Council member and Deputy Army Commander Yasir Al-Atta is closer to Minnawi and Gibril Ibrahim, facilitating military aid to the Joint Forces. Dhirar says, “The field situation will determine El-Fasher’s future politically, militarily, and strategically. In the medium term, the Joint Forces will be able to withstand the RSF, especially with an increase in fighters and significant stockpiles of military supplies.”
Dhirar believes the RSF aims to place the entire Darfur region under its political and military control, alongside calls to form a government to manage citizens’ affairs. Achieving this is challenging given the ground realities.
An Unbreakable Alliance
Meanwhile, the Minister of Culture and Information in Darfur Regional Government, Abdulaziz Suleiman Arowi, denies the existence of an international deal giving the Army and RSF a choice between Khartoum and El- Fasher. Arowi told “Ayin” and “Darfur24” that he rejects claims of international support for RSF’s capture of El-Fasher, stating, “The alliance of the Armed Forces and the Joint Forces will not be easily undermined, despite what some may promote.”
He added, “Whether the international community plans for this or not, the outcome depends on what we in Sudan want, and that is what will ultimately be achieved.” Arowi considers talk of an international deal for RSF to withdraw from the Sudanese Capital and Wad Madani in Gezira state in exchange for the Army’s withdrawal from El-Fasher to be baseless.
Arowi continues, “The Armed Forces have 30,000 soldiers in El- Fasher fighting with the Joint Forces. The field situation is continuously improving day by day, and the forces are close to ending the suffering of civilians there by expanding safe areas.”
He added, “The RSF insists on El-Fasher to control the entire Darfur region and negotiate with the Sudanese Government based on these developments. They are also planning to govern the region separately from the Sudanese state if an agreement with the government can not be reached, despite their failure to control four states under their control in the region, which they have turned into chaos.”
The city of El-Fasher remains under the control of the Armed forces and their allies from the Joint Forces, volunteers, and tribal fighting groups, while Hemedti’s forces are amassing fighters from outside the borders and neighboring states from communities that form these forces in a race for the last few meters toward the main city in the Darfur region.
If RSF takes control of El-Fasher, the Army will lose its last stronghold in the Darfur region, placing five states under Hemedti’s complete control in a region the size of France, marking the start of a new phase for the country, potentially divided into two failed states engaged in a prolonged war.