Darfur24: publish National Mechanism for Peace Monitoring and Evaluation in Sudan

National Mechanism for Peace Monitoring and Evaluation in Sudan

NIMPMES

Quarterly Situational Report

July 2021

Index:

   Abbreviations ————————————————————————  3

   Introduction—————————————————————————————- 5

   Methodology————————————————————————————–  6

   Summary ——————————————————————————————- 8

   Political Dynamics———————————————————– 9

   Domination of the military-TG over Peace Portfolio among others—————-13

The Prime Minister’s Initiative—————————————————————15                                       Security Arrangements—-     —————————————————— 17

   Differing Views on the Interpretations on Security arrangements———19

   JPA-Darfur Stream—————————————————————- 24

   JPA-Two Areas Stream———————————————————-  24

   JPA-Centre and North ————————————————————- 27

   Governance Conference———————————————————28

   Economic Challenges—————————————————29

   None SRF JPA Signatories————————————————-29

   Transitional Justice——————————————————————- -30

   Humanitarian Situation and AID Programmes——————————- 31

   Peace Implementation Matrix ————————————————–  32

   None JPA Signatories———————————————————– 32

   Peace Talks Between The Government and SPLM/AA———————— 33

   The Peace commission and High Council for Peace————————— 34

Abbreviations

• National Independent Mechanism for Peace Monitoring and Evaluation in Sudan: (NIMPMES)
• Juba Peace Agreement (JPA)
• Transitional Government in Sudan (TGS)
• Sudan People Liberation Movement – North led by Gen. Abdulaziz Adam Al-Hilu (SPLM-N AA).
• Darfur Stream of Juba Peace Agreement (JPA-DS)
• Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army – North (SPLM/A-N MA)
• Transitional Sovereignty Council (TSC)
• Juba peace agreement Two Areas (JPA-TAS)
• Eastern Sudan Stream of JPA (JPA-ES)
• Juba Peace Agreement Centre Stream (JPA-CS)
• Juba Peace Agreement North Stream (JPA-NS)
• Military component of the transitional government (military-TG)
• The Civilian Component of the Transitional Government (Civilian-TG)
• Sudan People Liberation Movement – North led by Abdel-Aziz Adam Alhilu (SPLM/A-N AA)
• Sudan Liberation movement led by Abd AlWahid Mohamed Nor: (SLM/A-Wahid)
• Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF)
• Sudan Liberation movement led byAhmed Hamid (SLM/A-Ali)
• Sudan Liberation movement led (SLM/A-Tambor)
• Force for Freedom and Change (FFC)
• Transitional Period Partners Council (TPPC)
• Central Council of the Force for Freedom and Change (FFC-CC)
• SRF faction of Sudan Revolutionary Front led by El-Hadi Idriss (SRF-Hadi)
• The Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA)
• The Islamic Counter Revolution (ICR)
• Resistance Committees “RCs”
• Sudan Professional Association (SPA),
• The Demanding Bodies Coalition (DBC)
• Sudan Armed Forces (SAF)
• General Intelligence Service (GIS)
• United Nations Transition Assistance Mission In Sudan UNITAMS
• Military Transitional Council (TMC)
• The Security Sector Reform (SSR)
• The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).
• Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF),
• Popular Security Service (PSS),
• National Security Service (NSS)
• The North Shield Force (NSF)
• Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

 

Introduction

The National Independent Mechanism for Peace Monitoring and Evaluation in Sudan (NIMPMES) is a national mechanism that aims to monitor and evaluate the peace process in Sudan. The mechanism has been closely monitoring the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement “JPA” since it was signed in Juba October 2020. This report aims to raise awareness among the Sudanese people, entities including peace parties, decision makers, civil society and all other regional and international peace partners and observants, on the progress of the implementation of Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and also about the peace talks with none JPA signatories, by understanding the dynamic among the various groups and having the latest updates about the reality of the peace process. Also, the mechanism aims to make sure that the Sudanese people are engaged in the peace process specially those in war zones through the open dialogue between the various parties and groups, in addition to its early warning program to guarantee a healthy implementation of Juba Peace agreement and put an end to the war in Sudan. The report covers the peace process and implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) in the period of October 2020 – July 2021.

Our Methodology:

The data collected for this report is based on the review of the peace agreement, interviews with the different parties, official sources, civil society and political leaders among the political groups and alliances, significant press conferences, interviews with community leaders and people in the ground levels as in displaced people, in addition to our close ground observations.

Photo: Malik Agar,  the transitional sovereignty council member, the president of SPLM/N MA, meeting with NIMPMES President Assad Altahir, Executive Director Alsanosi Adam.

Summary

●       The National Independent Mechanism for Peace Monitoring and Evaluation in Sudan has been closely monitoring the peace process in Sudan, Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) and the peace talks between the Transitional Government in Sudan (TGS) and  Sudan People Liberation Movement – North led by Gen. Abdulaziz Adam Al-Hilu (SPLM-N AA). ●      There has been very limited progress regarding JPA while there is no clear plan to resume the peace talks between TGS and SPLM-N AA. ●      Though some executive orders made by the peace partners regarding Darfur Stream of Juba Peace Agreement (JPA-DS) as in the inclusion on Mr. Altaher Hajjar and Dr. Elhadi Idriss to the Transitional Sovereign Council, Mr. Abdalla Yahya, Mr. Mohamed Bashir Abu Nammu, Mr. Hafiz Abdel-Nabi, Dr. Jibril Ibrahim and Mr. Ahmed Adam Bakhit to the Council of Ministers at the national level, in addition to the appointment of Mr. Minni Minnawi as the regional of governor of Darfur, Mr. Nimir Abdel-Rahman to be the governor of North darfur State and Mr. Khamis Abakar in the post of west Darfur state governor, yet less than 12 % of the mechanisms that incharge of the implementation of the peace agreement in Darfur are formed with no clear schedule for any procedure for the formation of these mechanisms nor the implementation of the JPA-DS itself ●      Regarding the two areas stream of Juba peace agreement Two Areas (JPA-TAS), Gen. Malik Agar the chairperson of Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army – North (SPLM/A-N MA) is included to the TSC, Mr. Yassir Arman to the office of the Prime Minister as a political advisor, Mrs. Butheina Dinar to the Council of Ministers, and Gen. Ahmed Al-Umda as a governor in Blue Nile state. Meanwhile, the splinters from SPLM/A-N MA headed by Gen. Khamis Jallab are also struggling to be included in the transitional government within the context of the two areas of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA-TAS). ●      Despite the importance of the implementation of Eastern Sudan Stream of JPA (JPA-ES), the provision seems to be dsiabled due to communal tension in eastern Sudan. An ongoing talks between the various actors mediated by a committee headed by Gen. Shams-Eddin Kabbashi, a committee explicitly formed to solve the peace issues in Eastern Sudan, power sharing in particular. ●      The political arrangements regarding Juba Peace Agreement Centre Stream (JPA-CS) and North Stream (JPA-NS) appear to be a frozen part of the agreement, despite the denial of the transitional government. Mr. Ibrahim Adlan, a member of the Democratic Union Party – SRF chaired by Mr. Al-Tom Hajju, the head of the Central Stream of JPA (JPA-CS), was appointed as the director of civil aviation authority in Sudan before JPA was signed in October 2020. ●      It appears that the division of the political landscape and the government among the domination of military component of the transitional government (military-TG) of the peace process represent the major challenge for the peace process, the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), reaching to a peace deal with SPLM-N of Abdel-Aziz Adam Alhilu (SPLM/A-N AA), SLM/A-Wahid and the other none JPA signatories. ●      The delay of the transitional security arrangements appears to be an obstacle for the other provisions of the agreement, as a consequence of the delay for this provision among the withdrawal of UNAMID, a fatal security gap across Darfur becomes a real threat to the people’s life as well as the stability in general. Also the current unrest in South and West Kordofan, eastern Sudan and Blue Nile are linked to the JPA implementation’s delay. ●      It appears that there’s no clear progress nor clear plan for the issue of the transitional justice including the major atrocities as in the war crimes, crimes against the humanity, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity in Darfur, the killing of the civil protests in Khartoum September 2013, December 2018 uprising and the June 3rd, 2019 in particular. ●      It is obvious that the communal division among the Sudanese people and the absence of a nationhood attitude resulted in creating fears from JPA which reflected in the formation of many peace counter groups or peace counter forces. ●      Lastly, it is also clear that the unwillingness among the peace partners, and the absence of the transparency in the implementation process of the peace agreement, with the shortage of the media coverage for the peace issue – government media in particular – that may disengage the citizens from the participation in the peace process and eventually may round JPA and any other coming peace agreements to the cycle of the former dysfunctional peace deals.

 

Political Dynamics

Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) is a multi-party agreement signed by different actors that are affiliated by different ideologies, various motives, different security orientations, and with different political agendas. Among the signatories of JPA on behalf of the armed groups are Sudan Revolutionary Front “SRF” as main negotiators, both SRF wings “SRF-Minnawi, SRF-Idriss”, other signatories as in SLM/A-Ali Ahmed Hamid, SLM/A-Tambor, SPLM-Third Front “Tamazuj”, while Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” the leader of Rapid Support Forces “RSF” signed the agreement on behalf of Sudan government. The implementation of the agreement is deeply connected to the social and political context including the political parties, civil societies, transitional government and various communities directly affected by the conflict. These different actors as well as the social and political context may impact the peace process as the agreement itself may change the overall dynamic of politics, transition, peace building and peace transformation as following:

 

• The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) signatories, Force for Freedom and Change (FFC) and the Transitional Government formed the Transitional Period Partners Council (TPPC) early December 2020. All components are presented by members, as SRF has 9 members, FFC 13 members, The prime minister, and Military-TG has 6 members among them the head of the council, Gen. Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan, the chairperson of the Transitional Sovereign Council.
• Many non-SRF joined the JPA under different names but all groups remained separately active in addition to the SRF’s factions.
• The Military Component of the Transitional Government (Military-TG) remains in control of the peace process as well as other portfolios, accommodating the JPA signatories, while the Civilian Component of the Transitional Government (Civilian-TG) are divided and mainly distant from JPA signatories.
• The center-peripheral theory is the main active theory in respect to the current situation, where people in Khartoum are divided into (North-Centre) Elites vs Other peripheral Elites as in Darfur and the two areas people.
• Some of the Centre elites are against JPA, while the peripherals are most supportive to JPA. This division is the main source for the rumors and the instability of the situation in Khartoum and other areas, Eastern Sudan in particular. The North Entity headed by Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Al-Jakoumi and the North-Call led by the former National Parliament Mr. Abu-El Gasim Burtum mainly opposed JPA-DS considering the agreement has given the Darfuri people more than they deserve on the account of the other Sudanese territories, and insisted on being presented in the agreement, and Jakoumi in Particular. The Center Entity raising concerns over the JPA-Center Stream “JPA-CS” claiming that the leader of the Center stream Mr. Al-Tom Hajju the leader of the Democratic Union – SRF and the signatory on behalf of JPA-CS doesn’t represent the center territory.
• The already existing division between the civil-TG, Military-TG and FFC is deeply enhanced after SRF signed the peace agreement, where all parties are trying to build new alliances to overcome their rivals.
• SRF faction of Sudan Revolutionary Front led by El-Hadi Idriss (SRF-Hadi) become more closer to Central Council of the Force for Freedom and Change (FFC-CC) that led by Sudanese Congress Party (SCP), Ba’athe Party, Nassiri Party and Gathering of the Unionist Opposition Party, while the other group of Sudan Revolutionary Front led by Mini Minnawi (SRF-Minni) entrenched its position within Sudan-Call and adopted the view of Umma Party on restructuring the FFC. Also, different SRF’s components made separate internal alliances with the civil-Tg and the Military-TG as well, e.g, some SRF’s components are close to RSF while others relate to SAF.
• The friction among the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC) led Umma Party that insists to restructure the coalition to the level that Umma Party frozen its membership within FFC last year, the Communist Party left the coalition and adopted the opposition against TG, while the rest of FFC having SCoP, Ba’athe, Nasiri and Democratic Union in Opposition Party as a group considered to be an incubator for the current Transitional Government (TG).
• RSF-Mnni held a series of meetings under Sudan Call umbrella that concluded by the formation of a technical committee to recruit other forces and to pursue its FFC’s restructuring agenda, while the SRF-Hadi held meetings under SRF theme in which declared its full support to the Central Council of FFC (FFC-CC) as well as to the recently announced initiative of the prime minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdouk.
• The prime minister’s initiative titled “The National Crisis and Transitional Issues – The Way Forward” proposed a comprehensive plan to solve the transitional issues including formation of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly (TNLA), Unifying FFC, Transitional Justice and other transition related issues as well as the way forward.
• The Central Council of the Forces for Freedom and Change including and SRF-Hadi fully supported the prime minister’s initiative while the FFC’s restructuring forces recruited more groups as in SRF-Minni, Umma Party of Ibrahim Al-Amin, Democratic Alliance for Social Justice, United Democratic Unionist led by Mr. Mohamed Ismat, Sudanese Ba’athe and Others to pursue its restructuring agenda while claiming its support to the prime minister’s initiative too, though it demands the initiative to be postponed until there is political consent among the actors, specially FFC reforms.
• The Communists Party, some Resistance Committees “RCs” as well as in the Islamic Counter Revolution (ICR) are heading with their agenda to pull down the transitional government, though there’s no any links or common grounds between these various forces. Communist Party and some RCs are closer to each other than to the ICR.
• The majority of the government related groups or components including the “Prime Minister, Military-TG, SRF-Idriss, Sudan Call” are calling for reconciliation with the islamists in order to have a peaceful transition, while the Communist Party and its allies from RCs reject all kinds of reconciliation with the islamists and ICR.
• The Military-TG hinted to include some Native Administration Leaders “NAL” and ICR to TNLA, as the Military-TG considered to put its hand on the 65 seats that are designated for the none-FFC Declaration signatories.
• The division of FFC resulted in the division of Sudan Professional Association (SPA), the leading force of December 2018’s uprising and the initiator of the FFC-Declaration. The new SPA factions took different positions based on the faction’s leader’s political affiliation. The original group, composed of FFC-CC related members as in Mr. Ismael Al-Taj and Dr. Mohamed Naji Al-Assam, is loyal to the transitional government, while the splinters “mostly communists” are loyal to the communist party and openly opposed to the government.
• Though the SPA that relates to FFC-CC appears to be inactive, the Communist-Loyal-SPA signed a political declaration with SPLM-N chaired by Abdul-Aziz Adam Al-Hilu (SPLM-N AA) in July 2020. The same declaration was also signed by other forces called The Demanding Bodies Coalition “DBC”.
• Though SPLM-N AA maintains some good relations with some political forces in Khartoum. Al-Hilu’s declaration of principles with the Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdouk in September 2020 wasn’t supported by any of these forces amid rejection of others including some FFC and ICR, while Al-Hliu-Buran’s declaration became the base of the peace talks between SPLM-N AA and TG. It is also not clear the reason behind the shift among the military-TG role where RSF leader Hemedti is replaced by Gen. Shams-Eddin Kabbashi of SAF to lead the government negotiating team.
• Recently, Abdel-Wahid Alnour the chairperson of Sudan Liberation Movement / Army (SLM/A-Wahid) visited Nuba Mountains, the strong hold of the SPLM-N AA where both parties issued a joined political statement listed their common grounds specially the issues of secularism and security sector reforms that were the main obstacles and the causes of the SPLM-N AA / TG peace talks suspension. The parties show understanding of each other’s positions though, but no joined peace talks ideas or views among the list.
• With the military domination of the peace process, the complexity of the political landscape among the division of the various political forces and armed groups of JPA, SPLM-N AA, SLM/A-Wahid, newly announced SPLM faction led the prominent Gen. Telephone Kuku and other non-JPA signatories, it is not clear yet, whether the TG, military-TG in particular considers a comprehensive plan to achieve a lasting peace deal.

Domination of the military-TG over Peace Portfolio among others

• Though It is clear that the transitional constitutional document tasked the transitional government (civil-TG) to achieve peace in Sudan within six months. Instead, the Military-TG intended to control the peace process since the beginning where Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan the head of the sovereign council issued a decree to form the High Council of Peace chaired by himself, and also formed the peace commission headed by Dr. Suleiman Mohamed Al-Debello annexed the commission to the high peace council in addition to the formation of the peace talks delegation without the involvement of the civil-TG October 2019.
• Military-GT has fully controlled the peace process, as in the peace talks with Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti) the deputy chairperson of the Transitional Sovereign Council led the government delegation until the signing of the JPA, and also with peace talks with SPLM-N AA as the government delegation headed by Gen. Shams-Eddin Kabbashi the member of the sovereign council.
• It is clear that the military-TG pushes its agenda on its peace talks with SPLM-N AA as SAF rejects the issue of the Security Sector Reforms (SSR), in addition to its rejection to the governance system and secularism proposed by SPLM-N AA.
• The transitional constitutional document guaranteed the power sharing between the FFC “civil component” and the former military council as it tasked the military-TG to be in charge of the nomination of defence and interior ministers.
• It appears that the military-TG remains in full control over all security sector entities including Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), General Intelligence Service (GIS), Police and Rapid Support forces (RSF), while making executive decision and orders to determine whether to intervene to restore the order and security during unrests.
• It is obvious that the military-TG is trying to separate the police and security entities from the civil-TG to show that the civil-TG is very weak and cannot be able to handle or restore peace in any conflicting areas. E.g, the military refused to intervene in Geneina January- April 2021 to deescalate the communal violence, and the same happened in many incidents in eastern Sudan.
• The military-TG extends its executive roles to include the foreign related issues, and that’s true especially with the Fashaga area issue. Gen. Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan militarily escalated the Fashagga issue against Ethiopia without the involvement of the civil-TG. The constitutional document does not mandate the military-TG to unilaterally declare the war against a neighbouring or any other country.
• It is obvious that the military is using the security unrest in the peripheries to raise its military agenda over the other civil-TG priorities as to enhance its political position and protect its investments’ networks and political interest across the country. The military-TG’s demands of power sharing in the governorship level also reveal the real intentions of the military-TG.
• The Military-TG is trying to keep the upper hand on security sector reform issues to enhance and protect its political power and economic interests that are covered by a vast investment network across Sudan.

Domination of the military on the executive Committees

In addition to the peace portfolios, the military-TG is also dominating other aspects and some executive portfolios as in the executive committees of the different issues, as follows:

• The military-TG to some extent was involved in the issue of the UN political mission to Sudan (UNITAMS) and formed a committee headed by Gen. Ibrahim Jabir Ibrahim Karima the member of the Sovereign Council to deal with UNITAMS. Such a committee resembles a similar tactic of the former regime on dealing with such missions through controlling and manipulating the activities of the mission, e.g, the former African mission in Sudan and also United Nation – African Union hybrid mission to Darfur (UNAMID). Gen. Ibrahim Jabir also heads the National Health Emergency Committee.
• The committee of the dismantlement (disempowering) of the former regime and recovery of the stolen money chaired by Gen. Yassir Al-Atta, the member of the sovereign council. Al-Atta always tries to disrupt the committee through different tactics, e.g, Gen. Yassir Al-Atta once claims his resignation from the committee without any clarification and later reclaimed his position within the committee. Also, the member of the military-TG component Gen. Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan directly intervened to disrupt the committee.
• An upper economic reform committee chaired by Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti”, despite the fact that the military-TG dominates the most investments in the country through their economic empires, oil, mining, crops, gum, meat, export and import operations in particular. Gen. Hemeti also chairs the National Committee for the JPA implementation.
• Shams-Eddin Kabbashi of the Sovereign Council is in charge of the Council of Ministers portfolios and the security sector as well (police in particular).
• Though the constitutional document stipulated that the Force for Freedom and Change (FFC) and former Military Transitional Council (TMC) to exchange the leadership of the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), these committees indicated that the military-TG intended to control all executive portfolios of the government.

The Prime Minister’s Initiative

• In his initiative of June 2021 titled “The National Crisis and Transitional Issues – The Way Forward” the transitional prime minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdouk highlighted the progress and the achievements of the transitional government regarding the ending of the longest international isolation for the country and lifting up the country’s name from the terrorist sponsors states list. Also, the prime minister listed the most challenging aspects that may face the transitional period starting from the economic situation, Security arrangements, Justice, national sovereignty, foreign relations, the accomplishment of the peace issue, obstacles of the disempowering of the former regime, institutions building as a lash back of the controversy and division in the political landscape, the lack of the centralized decision making as well as the absence of the common transitional priorities.
• The initiative played a major role to deescalate the growing tension among the various calls for protests June 30^th 2021, where different groups were calling to protest against the transitional government, the ICR in particular.
• Different sectors and entities highly welcomed the initiative as many expected the initiative may help to end the division of the political landscape and unify the FFC to lead the transitional period in an effective way.
• The initiative may heavily impact the peace process if FFC and the JPA signatories welcome and support the initiative that is already welcomed and supported by the vast majority of the protest’s movements and ordinary citizens.
• The security sector reforms, justice issues, the economic issues and the peace are the major issues that may pave the way for a peaceful transition in Sudan if the different parties prioritize the work according to the prime minister’s initiative.
• Though FFC-CC, many of the JPA signatories announced their full support of the prime minister’s initiative, it is not clear yet whether the military-TG is in the support line of the initiative.

 

Photo: Executive director Alsanosi Adam addresses the media in a press conference  after a meeting with Transitional sovereignty council  member and the president of (GSLF)  Altahir Hajar.

Security Arrangements:

The security arrangement protocol is considered to be the main protocol that may guide the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA). In addition to the security and protection tasks, the security protocol of JPA explicitly stated the issue of the Security Sector Reform (SSR) that include all regular forces entities as in Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), General Intelligence Service (GIS) and the Police Forces prior to the integration of the various forces of the armed groups including Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and others to the different security entities including Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the process of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

• The Juba Peace Agreement of Darfur Stream (JPA-DS) stated that a High Military Committee composed of JPA parties must be formed within seven days after JPA was signed October 2020 to carry on the duty of the security arrangement process. In July 2021 Gen. Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan partially announced the committee involving the names of the armed groups representatives while securing spaces for the Humanitarian Commission representatives, DDR representatives, UN-Mission in Sudan, AU, Tchad and South Sudan (mediator) representatives with no clarity regarding the Military-TG (SAF and RSF) representatives.
• According to (JPA), at least 12,000 of joined military forces constitutes the various forces of the JPA parties in Darfur including Sudan Liberation Movement / Army led by Minni Minawi (SLA-M), Sudan Liberation Movement / Army – Transitional Council (SLA-TC), Gathering of Sudan Liberation Forces (GSLF), Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), must be formed within 90 days to secure the situation and provide protection for civilians in Darfur, specially after the withdrawal of the hybrid mission of the United Nation and African Union in Darfur (UNAMID). But the joined force is not formed yet.
• Many of the SRF troops returned back to Sudan from the neighboring countries, as some arrived to Khartoum to be trained as special guards for their political leaders, especially those of SLA-Minni Minawi, JEM, SLA-TC and GSLF, and Sudan People Liberation Movement / Army led led by Mailk Agar (SPLA-N MA).
• The SRF groups and other JPA Signatories have been recruiting forces across Darfur, mainly SLA-TC, JEM, SPLA-N MA, Sudanese Alliance and Tamazuj group. The recruitment is also taking place in the main cities in South Darfur, East Darfur, West Darfur, Central Darfur, and also in the rural areas across Darfur.
• The recruitment and establishment of the cantonment sites have caused some disturbances and violence between the communities as it happened in Gussa-Njammat in Bulbul area where at least four people killed between Terjam tribe’s men and SLM-TC recruits, many villages burned as in Amakka-Sarra, Gussa-Njammat, Mero East, Mero West April 2021. Also, other fighting in the Majjangare area involves Tamazuj group where its leader Mohamed Idriss Eleiyan was killed in May 2021.
• Most of the new recruits of SLA-TC, JEM come from the IDPs camps while Tamazuj group mainly absorbs former Public Defense Forces (PDF), Popular Security Service (PSS), National Security Service (NSS) and others. JEM recruitment extends to include people and cantonment sites in West and South Kordofan. Also, SPLM-N MA recruits in Darfur in addition to its recruitment operation in Kordofan, White Nile and Blue Nile areas.
• All the military groups (SAF, RSF, SRF, Tamazuj) in Darfur appear to remain separately in their areas without any clear function or tasks towards the security and stability in Darfur. Some RSF patrols are moving in the North Darfur area “Desert Shield Forces”, but many security incidents are reported from the area, specially West of El-Fasher the capital town of North Darfur State.
• There have been many communal conflicts that took place as in the attack of Krinding IDPs camp in Geneina the Capital town of West Darfur twice since January 2021 where hundreds of people were killed, similar numbers wounded and others had to flee the camp and shelter the government premises, Mosques and schools. Greida violence, Majangary violence, Bulbul violence.
• Several murder incidents occurred against some leaders of the JPA signatories, as in Jabal Moon area against some JEM members who were ambushed by horses’ men and at least two people killed instantly and six other wounded in December 2020. An SLA-Minawi’s leader Mr. Mubarak Ahmed Nimeiri was killed on his way between Musbat and Hashaba area June 1^st,2021.

 

Photo: NIMPMES president Assad Altahir in a meeting with President of SRF Dr. Alhadi Idrees, transitional sovereignty council member.October 2020

 

Differing views on the  interpretations of the Security arrangement clause

• All parties agree that the transitional security arrangements of the JPA have been delayed, while the parties disagree on the perspectives and causes of the delay.
• It appears that SAF insists to maintain the upper hand in the Security Sector Reform (SSR) process, although the JPA armed movements insist to have equal representatives and responsibilities regarding the issue of SSR.
• At a debate organized by “Article Media Centre” in Khartoum June 5^th, 2021 participated by SAF representative Gen. Khalid Al-Shami, Dr. Suleiman Sandal of JEM, Gen. Jabir of SLA-Minawi, Gen. Mubarak of GSLF, Mr. Yassir Arman of SPLM/A-MA among others. The Parties blame each other on the delay of the agreement, while the majority accuses SAF for being responsible for the delay. SLA-Minawi accuses the civil political parties of lacking the political will, while SAF accuses the civil government for not being able to provide the needed logistics.
• It appears that SAF interprets the security arrangements provision as an integration process that SAF is the one in charge to curry on alone when receiving all required lists of the Armed Groups Personnel to be integrated to SAF, logistics and financial needs. Meanwhile, the armed groups interpret the provision as a fundamental reform issue where all parties must be equally represented in all mechanisms that curry on the security sector reforms.
• JEM, SPLM-N MA accuses SAF of the delay and more precisely SPLM-N accuses SAF-MI of recruiting new recruits on its behalf. While SLM/A-Minawi accuses the civilian political parties of making obstacles to the implementation of the peace agreement, and transitional security arrangement in particular.

Security Gap and Violence Incidents

Several incidents and violence took place in different areas amid the UNAMID withdrawal from Darfur. For example:

• In Geneina, the capital town of West Darfur State witnessed several bloody incidents between Massalit and Mahariya tribes, where hundreds of people were killed, wounded, properties looted and destroyed, specially the attacks on Krending IDPs’ camp (January, April 2021) the Arab tribes’ sit-in where the town was completely blocked for almost two weeks February 2021. Non-of the security forces (SAF, RSF, Police and Armed Movements) were intervened to stop the violence, though some of these security agencies personnel accused of their involvement in the violence.
• A territorial conflict between Fallatta and Massalit in the Gereida area of South Darfur December 2020.
• A bloody conflict between Fallatta and Rezeigat took place in the Al-Teweiyil area and spread across the southern part of South Darfur State where more than hundred people were killed, wounded and missing in January 2021. None of the security forces were instantly involved to stop the violence specially the police and SAF. RSF’s individuals were directly accused of their involvement in the violence. Also, no other security arrangements or procedures were taken by the government.
• Several incidents took place in Eastern Jebel Marra involving some Arabs vs SLA-Wahid splinters headed by commander Zu Al-Noun in the area of Leiba, and Kidiyneer by SLA-Wahid forces over gold mining fields. Also, some violence took place between SLA-Wahid’s forces and splinters in the same areas.
• The conflict between Beja, Nuba and Beni-Aamir in Eastern Sudan (Port-Sudan and Kassala). The conflict between Beja and Beni-Aamir was triggered by JPA where ICR’s affiliated Beja leaders rejected the JPA that was signed by Beni-Aamir leaders.
• The ongoing renewed conflict between Fallatta and Ta’aiesha tribes in Majjangare area of South Darfur, more recent in June – July 2021.
• The ongoing conflict between Kinana and Dar-Ali (Hawazma) tribes in Gadir locality – Kalogi town and its rurals – of South Kordofan July 2021.
• The ongoing and newly erupted conflict between Messeiriya and Hamar in West Kordofan July 2021.
• The transitional government, specially the military-TG shows no real actions to stop and end the violence in most of these incidents. Former governor of West Darfur Mr. Mohamed Abdalla Al-Duma calls for the UN intervention to provide security and protect the people of West Darfur April 2021 after all promises from Khartoum failed to end the violence in Geneina.

Tamazuj and North Shield

North Shield Forces the announced military wing of the North Entity headed by Mr. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed Al-Jakoumi and Tamazuj movement led by Mr. Mohamed Ali Gurrashi were annexed to the JPA. Though the North Shield Forces (NSF) was not clearly assigned security arrangements, Tamazuj movement is a mere military group that is annexed to the agreement during the signing of the JPA.

• North Shield Forces “NSF” – the military wing of the North Entity – secretly mobilizing people from the center with military background to be registered within the new recruits.
• Tamazuj movement from the other side is a military movement signed JPA-Tam for security arrangement only. Tamazuj security arrangement provision is intended to integrate Tamazuj forces to the regular forces within a period of six months after signing peace agreement. Though no specific number was determined from Tamazuj forces to be included to the regular forces, article 24,5 in the provision clarifies that SAF will arrange the financial and logistic needs for the process of Tamazuj’s integration to SAF.
• Both groups are absorbing the former military personnel of the ousted regime, whether they were PDF, SAF, NSS or any other security entities.
• It appears that Tamazuj is absorbing all elements, military and civilians, while NSF is secretly recruiting only those with military background. Both groups appear to have close relations with SAF.
• Tamazuj divided to its primary components, as in Tamazuj faction led Mr. Mohamed Ali Gurrashi and Tamazuj Jelhak led By Gen. Jibril Bukhari.
• Both Tamazuj groups accuse each other of having hidden links to either SAF or RSF. As in Tamazuj led By Gurrashi appears to be close to RSF, while the Jelhak group appears to have a link to SAF.
• Mohamed Ali Gurrashi group based and recruits people mainly in Kordofan and Darfur, and Jelhak group recruits people across Sudan.

Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) vs Rapid Support Forces (RSF)

Despite that the military-TG appears to act as a one (united) block regarding its participation within the transitional government, but a real rift disdains the two main armed forces of the military-TG, mainly Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The division between SAF and RSF appears in the RSF’s recruitment among the armed groups and their leaders, meanwhile SAF heavily invests in the political parties and some native administration leaders. The conflict between the two main armed forces of the military-TG resulted in:

• Rapid Support Forces (RSF) built allies and supported some of the armed groups “former rebels”, especially in Darfur and West Kordofan, and helped to annex these groups to the Juba Peace Agreement. Also RSF maintains some good relations with some SRF groups in order to strengthen its position.
• Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) heavily invested in the media and center-oriented groups that demand the integration of all armed forces to SAF including RSF, while RSF is officially recognized as a regular force according to the constitutional document and Juba Peace Agreement.
• The continuous tension between SAF and RSF clearly reflected on the speeches of RSF leaders and SAF commanders against each other on different occasions, e.g, Gen. Hemedti of the RSF stated during the memorial of Mr. Mubarak Ahmed Nimeiri of SLM-Minawi that “They accuse us as not professional army, while we train our forces in nine monthes course of training, and SAF train only four months”.
• The escalation between the two forces is a major source of rumors of potential conflict between the forces in Khartoum. Many officials, including the prime ministers and seniors in his office, consider the competition between SAF and RSF as a major threat to the transition in Sudan.
• Both armies are very active economically and control vast investment networks.

 

Photo: NIMPMES president Assad Altair after a meeting with the spokesperson of Sudan  government and the member of Sudan Transitional  sovereignty Council, september 2020

 

Photo: Transitional Sovereignty Council member Altahir Hajar in a meeting with NIMPMES members

 

JPA – Darfur Stream

Darfur path is the major element of the JPA, where the main armed parties of the movement as in SLA-Minni Minawi, GSLF, JEM, SLM/A-TC and others are based. Most of the forces are located in the northern part of Darfur “North Darfur State” as a gateway for the groups on their way back from Libya, as many of these groups were involved in the Libyan conflict.

• The leaders “Heads of each group” of Darfuri JPA’s path are all included to the newly formed Transitional Period Partners Council (TPPC) which is composed of FFC, Civil-TG, Military-TG and the Armed Movements “AM”.
• At least three people of the Armed Movements are included to the Transitional Sovereign Council “TSC” as Mr. El-Tahie Hajjar of GSLF, Dr. Elhadi Idriss of SLM/A-TC and DR. Jibril Ibrahim of JEM. While other five minister is included to the Council of Ministers as in Mr. Abdalla Yahya of GSLA minister of infrastructure and urban planning, Mr. Mohamed Bashir Abu Nammo minister of Mining, Mr. Hafiz Abdel-Nabbi minister of animal resources, in addition to Dr. Jibril Ibrahim, minister of finance and economic planning.
• Also Mr. Minni Minawi, the chairman of SLM/A-Minni Minawi is appointed as Darfur regional governor, while Mr. Nimir Abdel-Rahman appointed as North Darfur governor and Mr. Khamis Abaker as a governor of West Darfur.
• Recently, the local governance law for Darfur was approved in July 2021.
• A follow-up committee of JPA-DS headed by Mr. Mohamed Hassan El-Ta’aieshi concluded that JPA-DS’ implementation percentages are about 11,8 %, 19,3 % under process, and 68,9 % pending regarding the formation of the peace mechanisms.

 

JPA – Two Areas Stream

Blue Nile and South Kordofan “usually referred to as two areas” where SPLM/A-MA signed the agreement with the transitional government. The two areas constitute the Southern and Southern-East of Sudan where SPLM/A has been fighting Sudan Governments for more than three decades.

• Malik Agar, the chairman of SPLM-N Malik Agar (SPLM-N MA) appointed as a member of the TSC, while Mrs. Butheina Dinar is appointed as a minister of Central Governance, though Gen. Ahmed Al-Umda was recently appointed as a governor of Blue Nile state.
• The division with SPLM-N MA in two factions headed by Malik Agar and the splinter Khamis Jallab may barely affect the implementation of the JPA-two areas streams. The deputy chairperson of SPLM-N MA, Yassir Arman is appointed as a political advisor of the prime minister regardless of the fact that the step may discredit the PM before Khamis Jallab followers. Jallab also chose his seat among the SRF-Minnawi, though Arman and Agar kept their membership within SRF-Idriss.

 

JPA – Eastern Stream (JPA-ES)

Though there’s no ongoing real war on the ground, JPA-Eastern Stream (JPA-ES) can be considered of the same significance as the TWO areas and Darfur Streams. As many Darfuri factions signed Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), two other factions have signed JPA-ES as in Beja Congress – Opposition headed by Mr. Osama Saeed and United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice Mr. Khalid Shaweesh.

• Both parties blame the military component of the transitional government for the delay of the implementation of JPA-ES. Some monitors from eastern Sudan perceive the JPA-ES as a frozen protocol.
• The agreement guaranteed Eastern Sudan a percentage of power sharing as well as a percentage of the resources. Power sharing provision specified a 30% for the representation of the Beja Opposition Conference and the United Popular Front for Liberation and Justice in the States’ legislation in Red Sea, Kassala and Gaddariff states. Also, JPA-ES specified representation of Eastern Sudan people within the public service with 14%. But none of the provisions are implemented as no legislation is formed yet, including the national level.
• Communal tension in eastern Sudan escalated immediately after signing JPA, where Beja headed by the native leader Mohamed Al-Amin Tirik refused the FFC’s chozen governor Mr. Salih Ammar based on an ethnic motive, and the prime minister positively responded to Beja demand by removing the governor.
• The prime minister formed a committee composed of FFC members, JPA-ES members and the Native administration leaders “High Council of Beja Nazirs’ ‘to remove the obstacles and constraints of JPA-ES. The committee never met to discuss the issue.
• The usual communal tension in Eastern Sudan was between the Beja and Beni-Aamir groups, but recently the tension and conflict dynamic extended to include most of the other groups specially the Nuba and Darfur-origin ethnic groups, specially the recent violence between Beni-Aamir and Darfur-Origin groups July 2021.
• Beja leader Mr. Mohamed Al-Amin Tirik, loyal to the former regime, has his demands evolved to the national level and clearly stated political demands targeting the former regime destabilising committee – simply known as Tamkin removing committee”. Tirik conditioned the dissolvement of the committee to escalate the tension in Eastern Sudan as they usually threaten to close the national roads to eastern Sudan.
• Some SRF leaders, Minnawi in particular, consider the freeze of JPA-ES to be linked to Eastern Sudan Conference that was supposed to take place within six months after signing the JPA. But no single step was taken regarding the conference.

 

JPA – Centre and North Streams

The Centre and North streams of JPA are political arrangements. The Centre Stream headed by Mr. Al-Tom Hajju the chairperson of the Union Party – SRF, and North Stream headed by Mr. Mohamed Da’oud Bandaq the chairperson of Kush Liberation. Both streams are of less activity regarding the implementation of JPA. As for current situation:

• Al-Tom Hajju and Mr. Mohamed Da’oud Bandaq are both included to the Transitional Period Partners Council (TPPC).
• Ibrahim Adlan of the Union Party – RSF was appointed as director of the civil aviation authority before the JPA was signed in October 2020.
• The peace commissioner stated that the commission submitted a proposal for the implementation of JPA-NS to the council of ministers including all requirements for further action regarding the implementation of JPA-NS.

 

 

Photo: NIMPMES president Assad Altahir in a closed meeting with transitional sovereignty council member Altahir Hajar

 

 

Governance Conference

• The Juba Peace Agreement stipulated that a national governance conference must be held within a period of six month after signing the JPA to discuss the issue of the governance system in Sudan, as the agreement clearly stated that the country must switch back to the old regional system.
• A Technical committee headed by Mr. Mohamed Hassan Al-Ta’aieshi was formed for the governance conference preparation was formed late March 2021.
• Under the supervision and sponsorship of the ministry of the central governance and the preparation of the technical committee, a governance conference workshop was held Late April 2021 and intended to prepare for the governance conference according to the JPA. The attendance was about 300 members including central government representatives, JPA peace partners, all governors and some community leaders, women and youth representatives.
• The discussion was about the possibilities of the implementation of JPA regarding the governance systems and switching from the current state system to the old regional systems.
• Though the outcome was to hold the regional grassroots governance conferences to make sure that each region developed and adopted its own local governance law in accordance with the national constitutional document, the differences and disputed issues dominate the workshop. For instance, Mr. Mohamed Abdalla Al-Duma clearly objected to the appointment of Minni Minawi as a regional governor for Darfur, while Massaleat’s Sultan talked about self-governance based on the 1919 agreement between the British condominium government of Sudan and Sultan of Massaleat in West Darfur.
• Representatives from West Kordofan argue that there must be a total separation between the Nuba territory in South Kordofan and the non-Nuba ones in West Kordofan. The representative refused that the region of Kordofan shouldn’t include both South Kordofan and West Kordofan at once. The Messeiriya demand their own separate state or region in Kordofan.
• West Kordofan’s Messeiriya representative rejected the regional governance system unless West Kordofan was considered to be either a separate region to rule itself or it would remain a state that has no any link to any regional government, but its own government with direct link to the central government.
• Amna Makki, the governor of River Nile state apparently considers the newly adopted regional system may not fit the local governance system in Sudan.
• Former governor of Darfur, Dr. Tejani Sessi, Leader of Liberation and Justice Movement and the main signatory of Doha Darfur Peace Agreement (DDPA) 2011, stated that Dar Massaleat was not part of Darfur until 1919, but he considers that any decision regarding the future Dar Massaleat has to be part of Darfur’s decision.
• The local governance law for Darfur region is approved separately this July 2021, but no clear plan for the national governance conference to discuss the other regional governance system and law.
• It is of importance to mention that the governance issue was one of the main disputed issues that led to the suspension of the peace talks between SPLM-N AA and the transitional government.

 

Economic Challenges

While some of the peace partners refers the peace constraints to the absence of political will as in SLM/A-Minni, JEM and SPLM-N MA blames SAF and SAF-MI, SAF and HALF refers the causes of the delay of peace implementation to the economical situation. For instance:

• SAF representative in security arrangement Gen. Khalid Al-Shami claims they have handed over their budget plan to the ministry of finance since November 2020 and blames the former acting minister of finance Mrs. Hiba Mohamed Ali, though JEM objects to the step and considers it as a violation to the peace agreement.
• Al-Tahir Hajar, the chairman of GSLF, in an interview with the researchers of NIMPMES in March 2021 disclosed that the logistics and financial support are the major challenge of the implementation of the peace agreement.
• Malik Agar, the chairman of SPLM-N MA from his sight expressed his hopes in the agreement
• Minni Minawi, the chairman of SLM/A- Mini demanded a primary amount of $ 700,000 to start the implementation of the JPA-Darfur stream, immediately after his appointment as Darfur regional governor. Mr. Minni Minwai paid a visit to Saudi Arabia July 2021 to recruit funds for the implementation of JPA-Darfur stream.

 

None SRF JPA Signatories

Beside SRF, a dozen of armed movement including Sudanese Alliance headed by Khamis Abaker the current governor of West Darfur, Tamazuj movement “Third Front – Tamazuj, Jelhak and Abu-Mattariq”, SLM/A-Ibrahim Kazinski’s splinters headed Ali Ahmed Hamid “Shakoush”, SLM/A-Mustafa Nasr-Eddin Tambor.

• Sudanese Alliance, which is composed of several groups, appears to be close to RSF, as many sources confirmed that RSF commander Gen. Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo funded its initial conference in Addis Ababa 2019.
• SLM/A Ali Hamid Shakoush and SLM/A-Tambour have their both leaders descended from central Darfur, contesting among each other on the governor seat of central Darfur, which indicates that the groups are of local interest-oriented groups. No clear yet which of the main actors will accommodate each group, though Tambor has communication with SRF-Minawi group.
• Tamamzuj is divided into two main groups, the first group headed by Dr. Mohamed Ali Gurrashi from Ali Abu Matariq of East Darfur, and Tamazuj’s splinter group headed by Dr. Mohamed Ismael Mohamed Adam (Zero). Tamazuj signed a security provision intended to integrate its forces to the various regular forces “SAF, RSF, Police and GSA” within six months, though there’s no specified number of the soldiers.

 

Transitional Justice

The Transitional Justice (TJ) is among the pillars of the peace building and transitional process itself, as justice was a main component of the uprising slogan “Freedom, Peace, Justice”, as well as a whole provision was specified for transitional justice in the JPA. There have been a variety of efforts regarding transitional justice, but there’s no clear track on how transitional justice can be carried out or achieved. Though:

• The Minister of Justice Dr. Nasr-Eddin Abdel-Bari announced that the law of transitional justice was approved among other laws late April 2021, while some SRF groups demanded more time to make sure their input is included. According to the JPA peace agreement TJC among other commissions must be formed in a period of 60 days. The Transitional Justice Commission (TJC) has not been formed yet.
• It appears that there’s no precise records regarding the justice issues “crimes, atrocities, human rights violations” ..etc, specially in the war zones “Darfur, South Kordofan, Blue Nile” in the period after 2007, though ICC indicted some former regime leaders of crimes against Humanity, Ethnic cleansing, genocide and war crimes.
• The atrocities committed against civil protests during the uprising during September 2013, Dec 2018, June 2019 are only followed by the victims’ families and relatives, but not the political entities nor the transitional government that replaced the former regime after the succession of the uprising in 2019.
• Victims’ families and relatives differ on the perspective of transitional justice itself. Some victims’ families and relatives are demanding retribution, other accusing a specific group among the security entities to be responsible for the atrocities, another group has already accepted ransoms through a mediation formed by the military-TG for the purpose, to offer amnesty and reconciliation in return.
• While Minister of Justice Dr. Nasr Eldeen Abdel-Bari expected to form the commission soon, Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdouk has initiated an independent commission for transitional justice as part of his overall initiative “Transitional Issues – The way forward”, while civil society, advocacy groups, and some victims’ families and relatives refused both proposals of the justice minister as well as the one of the prime minister.
• It appears that the military-TG is more keen on reconciliation than the whole transitional justice system, while the political incubator for the transitional government shows no clear interest in the process in general.
• Most of the IDPs, Refugees and a significant group of uprising victims’ families strongly distrust the justice system and highly rely on ICC to bring them justice.

 

Humanitarian Situation and AID programmes

The Humanitarian provision in JPA considers AID programme, Repatriation, Social and economical integration of the IDPs and Refugees and addition to the rights of the people regarding the access to humanitarian aids.

• In terms of humanitarian aid the situation in Darfur as well as in the two areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan) remains as it was, since the former regime expelled almost all international humanitarian agencies, where people are struggling to meet most of their demands, e,g. education, security and so on.
• More IDPs arrived at IDPs camps in Nyala, Zalingy and El-Fasher because of the violence in Jebel Marra in Darfur.
• The Peace Commissioner Dr. Suleiman Al-Debello considered the humanitarian provision in JPA to be the most important provision after the security arrangement one, especially the repatriation of IDPs and refugees, but nothing has happened yet.

 

Peace Implementation Matrix of JPA

The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA) was annexed by an implementation matrix that includes all time tables for the implementation of all agreement’s aspects. It seems none of the content of the matrix met its deadline in accord with.

• The agreement was to be included in the constitutional document within seven days after it was signed, while the appointment of the parties in the agreed portfolios must have taken place – including those of the legislation- within 60 days. Only the appointment of the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC) has taken place after more than four months.
• According to the agreement, the local governance conference must take place within a period of 60 days. The conference didn’t take place in the intended period, but a technical workshop regarding the issue was held in the period of 27 – 29 April 2021.
• The National Commissions with an equal representation of the parties are designated to be formed within a period of 60 days including the Religious Freedom Commission, Justice Commission, Law and Constitution reforms, Peace Commission, Land Commissions, Nomads and Herders among others. None of these commissions are formed, except the peace commission that was already formed ahead of the peace talks “September 2019”.
• A consultative conference for Eastern Sudan is assigned to be held within 45 days after the approval of the peace agreement by the yet to be formed National Legislation Assembly. Neither the national legislature nor the east Sudan consultative conference is held.

Cancelation of the Peace Implementation Matrix

The Peace Commission revealed that the agreed matrix of the peace process was canceled and another beginning date was set for the implementation of the peace agreement (April 15^th 202) instead of the immediateness after the agreement was signed October 2020.

 

None JPA signatories

Most of the SRF factions signed the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA), but dozens of armed groups among them SLM/A-Wahid are not part of Juba Peace Agreement. SLM/A-Wahid and some other splinters occupy most of Marra Mountain’s tip while others are active in other areas north of the mountain. Some none-JPA signatories like Musa Hilal’s among others are active in the desert to the depth of the Libyan territory.

• SLM/A-Wahid initially rejected JPA and proposed in return an initiative of Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue to solve the Sudanese root causes of the crisis. Abdel-Wahid Nour the chairperson of SLM/A-Wahid returned to the region after his prolonged existence in Europe to discuss his initiative with the mediation “South Sudan Government”.
• Other SLM/As factions “Wahid’s splintery” have no connections nor communication with the JPA mediator and no clear plan to include them into JPA.
• Some fighting reported from northern Jebel Marra early this month involved Wahid’s forces and the splinters’ ones headed by Mubarak Wuldouk and others.
• Recently, Wahid forces reported to be involved in an engagement with some SAF-paramilitary group headed by Sadiq Al-Fukka in the area of Sertuni which disturbed the IDPs in Sertuni IDPs’ camp in North Darfur State. Some IDPs reported to have reached IDPs’ camps in Nyala, Fahser and Zalingy.
• Other armed factions “SLM/A, JEM, Others” are also not included in JPA.

 

Peace Talks between the government and SPLM/A-N AA

The peace talks with SPLM/A-N AA remained intermittent during the whole period of the peace talks with SRF. The process itself has directed to separate causes of conflict based on regional aspects.

• The main obstacle for peace talks proceeding was the rejection of the government delegation of SPLM/A-N AA’s demands for secularism, security sector reforms and governance system that was proposed by SPLM-N AA.
• Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdouk issued a joined declaration of principles with Gen. Abdulaziz Al-Hilu in Addis Ababa September 2020 to pave the way for the resumption of the peace talks, but the declaration was rejected by the military-TG, FFC and most of the Islamists and ICR groups.
• The head of the Sovereign Council “SC” Gen. Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan himself signed a joined declaration with Al-Hilu in Juba late March 2021.
• Though the Prime Minister Dr. Abdalla Hamdouk, accompanied by many other ministers of the civil-TG attended the opening session with SPLM/A … Date .. in Juba, the delegation of the transitional government delegation was chaired by Gen. Shams-Eddin Kabbashi the member of the Sovereign Council.
• It appears that the military-TG is planning to keep control of the peace portfolio, which can explain the military-TG rejection of Al-Hilu-Hamdouk’s Addis declaration of principle.
• Only SPLM/A-N AA proposed some negotiation papers, while the government delegation discussed the SPLM presented papers but proposed nothing. SPLM-N AA accuses the government delegation of intentionally leaking the papers in order to mobilize the public against SPLM’s vision regarding secularism and identity issues.
• The newly announced SPLM faction chaired by Gen. Telephone Kuku, also is something that may affect the unity of the Nuba community, specially those who remained as social context and primary supporters for SPLM-N AA. In possible talks between the newly announced faction and the Military-TG, may end up in a communal escalation in Nuba mountains.

 

The Peace Commission and High Council for Peace

The current peace commission was formed ahead of the peace talks commencing October 2019 together with the High Council of Peace (HCP). The peace commission which is recognised by the transitional constitutional document is headed by Dr. Suleiman Mohamed Al-Debello, though the un-constitutionally recognized High Peace Council is chaired by Gen. Abdel-Fattah Al-Burhan the head of the Transitional Sovereign Council. According to JPA the peace commission must be restructured to include all peace partners. According to the current peace commissioner Debello, the commission plays a significant role to make sure JPA is implemented.

• The peace commission formed many teams to explain the JPA and disseminate the peace message across Darfur. The commission considers the division of FFC may negatively impact the implementation of JPA.
• Peace Commissioner Dr. Suleiman Al-Debello stated that the main defect of the JPA is that the agreement has no pre-transitional period to enable the parties prepare themselves as well as to provide the needed financial and logistic support.
• Debello claims that the parties agreed to compensate for the pre-transitional period and pushed the implementation matrix to April 15^th, 2021 as the starting date for the implementation of the agreement.
• The Peace Commissioner considers the delay of the security arrangement is part of the whole delay of the JPA implementation.
• Commissioner Suleiman Al-Debello considers only the Tamazuj movement of Dr. Mohammed Ali Gurrashi and not the other groups of Tamazuj “Jibril Bukhari and Kerbino”.
• Regarding JPA-ES, the Peace Commission denies that the JPA-ES is being frozen, but considers the local resistance and communal division to be the main obstacles for the JPA-ES implementation process. Debello stated that A committee to solve eastern Sudan peace issues headed by Gen. Shams-Eddin Kabbashi, membership of Mr. Mohamed Hassan El-Ta’aieshi of the Sovereign Council, and Dr. Suleiman Moahmed Al-Debello as a secretary of the committee.
• Al-Delleo reveals that an ongoing discussion about the power sharing in Eastern Sudan between JPA-ES signatories and those who resist the agreement among others to make sure everyone is included in the transitional government in Eastern Sudan.

 

Photos: At the Lunching of the NIMPMES, March 2021

 

Assad Altahir at Suna, Announce the birth of the National Independent Mechanism for peace monitoring and evaluation

Photo: After the meeting between FFC-CC, SRF, Uma Party in July 2021

Photo: after a meeting of FFC- Technical committee SRF-Minawi, Uma Party, UDUP, DASJ, Sudanese Ba’ath in July 2021